This article examines the web-based social responsibility reporting of the 100 largest companies in six broad industrial sectors to determine the extent to which the reporting follows the specific guidance of the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) G3 Human Rights Performance Indicators (HR1-HR9). Ninety-seven of these companies have some sort of social information on their websites, and 95 of them have formal corporate responsibility reports. Seventy-one of these companies indicate that their reports were based on the G3 guidelines, and 66 of these provide a detailed index to them. The nine G3 HR guidelines can be subdivided into 17 specific items; six of them can be interpreted as requiring only that actions or measures taken be described, and these are widely followed, primarily in the form of policy statements. The remaining items, reported much less frequently, are quantitative, requiring total numbers or percentages of specific actions or incidents, or identification of operations in which such incidents are at significant risk. Thus, although the G3 guidelines for human rights reporting contemplate quantitative statements of performance, most of the reports examined for this article do not provide any, nor, for the most part, indicate why not. I argue that the reporting likely would be more informative if the guidelines were rewritten to request the nature of the processes and procedures the company is implementing for achieving the desired human rights outcomes, and the degree to which they are in place.
Introduction
Globalization carries with it the risk of decreased human rights in developing countries (Tandon 1999) as well as opportunities for increasing them by virtue of the fact that there is now a group of companies with greater experts, in dozens of countries worldwide (GRI 2008a) , the principal activity of which is to encourage companies to report periodically on their environmental and social policies, actions and impacts. The main vehicle for accomplishing this is a set of reporting guidelines, now in their third generation, the G3 guidelines (GRI 2006) , a section of which is devoted to human rights. The GRI recently commissioned a study of the degree to which the nine G3 Human Rights Performance Indicators were being followed in corporate reporting by 100 companies which 'GRI randomly identified... reflecting the overall pool of GRI reporters,' 59 of which had identified themselves as users of the G3 guidelines. That study based on corporate materials available on the web in June 2007 judged that fewer than a third of the companies were even in partial compliance with any of the G3 human rights performance indicators, and fewer than12 per cent were in full compliance with any of them, although a much larger percentage mentioned most of the topics in some context. The present study, based on corporate reporting at the beginning of November 2008, a year and a half later than the reporting analyzed in Morhardt et al. (2008) , also examines compliance with the G3 HR performance indicators in 100 companies, but those were explicitly chosen as the largest companies in six broad industrial sectors, irrespective of GRI affiliation or G3 reporting status, and the performance indicators were subdivided into their component parts for a clearer distinction between partial and full reporting. Thirty-one of the companies overlapped with those considered in Morhardt et al. (2008) but for all except two (BMW and Enel) the sustainability report was more recent, usually dated one year later, indicating that this set of companies is reporting annually.
Although there have been many surveys of the sustainability reporting of large corporations (e.g., Belal 2001, Bonsón and Escobar 2002 , Brammer and Pavelin 2004 , Davis-Walling and Batterman 1997 , Gray et al. 1995 , Hedberg and von Malmborg 2003 , Hoffmann 2003 , Holcomb et al. 2007 , Kolk 2003 , Kolk 2004a , Kolk 2004b , Kolk 2008 , Kolk et al. 2001 , KPMG 1999 , KPMG International 2005 , KPMG International 2008 , Krut and Moretz 2000 , Lober et al. 1997 , Marston and Polei 2004 , Martin and Hadley 2006 , Morhardt 2001 , Morhardt 2002 , Morhardt and Adidjaja 2007 , Murthy and Abeysekera 2008 , Raman 2006 , Rikhardsson et al. 2002 , Rothenberg et al. 2001 , Sinclair and Walton 2003 , Vormedal and Ruud 2006 but only two have examined specific compliance with GRI reporting guidelines (Morhardt 2001 , Rikhardsson et al. 2002 and none with the newer G3 guidelines.
This article is the first to make a detailed analysis of compliance with any of the GRI G3 guidelines, and is therefore the first indication of whether reference to their guidance in corporate sustainability reports-which is quite common-reflects careful adherence to the guidelines, or merely that the topics covered by the guidelines were addressed in some manner. The results of this paper show that for many topics, it is the latter, suggesting a willingness to broach the subjects, but an inability or unwillingness to do so in the way that meets the letter of the guidelines.
Methodology
Six broad industrial sectors were defined (identified in . It also excluded three of the banks on the Fortune Global 100 list because there were 17 larger ones and I limited each sector to 16 or 17 to make them approximately equal in size and total 100. To make up for the excluded companies, the largest ones farther down in the Global 500 ranking within the six broad sectors were added. The result is a collection of 100 companies that is confined to six broad sectors, allowing a direct comparison across sectors. Of the 26 excluded companies, only two (Carrefour in the Food and Drug Store sector and Procter & Gamble in the Household and Personal Products sector) are listed in the GRI 2008 Reports List (GRI 2008b) , but all three excluded banks are on the list.
The websites of each company were visited during the first week in November 2008, and the latest material dealing with human rights policy and actions was downloaded. In most cases, this was a formal report referred to as a sustainability report, sustainable development report, corporate citizenship report, corporate responsibility report or something similar. In two cases it was a section of an annual report, and in six others, it was web pages that were either extremely minimal, or just devoted to environmental matters. The Fortune Global 500 rank of the reporting companies, GRI reporting status (G3, G2, or non-GRI), and report titles are provided in Appendix A. The materials were searched initially for reference to GRI, then it was determined by inspection if the reference was to the GRI G3 guidelines. If there was a GRI content index, either in the report or online, pages treating specific G3 guidelines were identified and examined. Reports that had clearly followed the G3 guidelines were classified as G3 reports. These did not include reports that simply mentioned the G3 guidelines in passing or mentioned that the G3 guidelines were referred to, in some undefined way. For reports with a GRI index, all pages identified as having human rights materials were inspected, but all reports were searched for key words including human rights, investment(s), supplier(s), training, discrimination, collective bargaining, right of association, labour union(s), child labour, forced or compulsory labour and indigenous peoples. These searches characteristically turned up the same pages referred to in the GRI content indices in reports that had them. Percentmage of significant suppliers and contractors that have undergone screening on human rights (HR2A), and actions (HR2B).
HR3
Total hours of employee training on policies and procedures concerning aspects of human rights that are relevant to operations (HR3A) including the percentage of employees trained (HR3B).
HR4
Total number of incidents of discrimination (HR4A) and actions taken (HR4B).
HR5
Operations identified in which the right to exercise freedom of association and collective bargaining may be at significant risk (HR5A), and actions taken to support these rights (HR5B).
HR6
Operations identified as having significant risk for incidents of child labour (HR6A) and measures taken to contribute to the elimination of child labour (HR6B).
HR7
Operations identified as having significant risk for incidents of forced or compulsory labour (HR7A), and measures taken to contribute to the elimination of forced or compulsory labour (HR7B).
HR8
Percentage of security personnel trained in the organization's policies or procedures concerning aspects of human rights that are relevant to operations.
HR9
Total number of incidents of violations involving rights of indigenous people (HR9A) and actions taken (HR9B).
Source: Author's own.
All but one (HR8) of the G3 HR guidelines (see Table 2 ) has two parts, and each of these was represented by parts A and B in this study. Most of the guidelines call for highly specific data and it is quite clear whether they are met or not. Six of them (HR2B, 4B, 5B, 6B, 7B, and 9B), however, call for a description of actions or measures taken to achieve a particular human rights goal, but do not specify what sort of action or measure is contemplated. When a company reported formal adoption of specific policies relevant to one of these topics, I scored that as meeting the requirements of the guidelines for actions or measures on that topic. A more conservative interpretation would be that some action beyond adopting a policy is necessary to constitute an action or measure. Had I adopted such an interpretation, the level of compliance with these six guidelines would have been considerably lower.
Results and Discussion
Ninety-seven of the 100 company websites reviewed here had some sort of corporate social responsibility information and 95 had a formal, and often quite extensive social responsibility report. This is much higher than that found in a 2000 survey of Fortune Global 500 websites in which 18 per cent of the companies had some sort of integrated environmental and social information and five per cent had a specific social report (Rikhardsson, Andersen and Bang 2002) , and also much higher than the 64 per cent of the Fortune Global 250 companies reviewed in 2004 (Kolk 2008) with any kind of social sustainability information and more than twice as high as the 42 per cent with separate sustainability reports (economic, environmental, social), and social and environmental reports (Kolk 2008) . Some of the differences result from the fact that most of the companies I excluded (because they were not in the broad sectors I wished to compare) are not GRI compliant. Thus, the sectors included in this analysis are ones in which compliance is high, but an increasing trend in reporting is also reflected by a similar increase in corporate responsibility reporting between KPMG's analysis of the largest 250 companies of which 52 per cent Seventy-one of the reports and web pages reviewed here were written following at least some of the GRI G3 guidelines, and 66 of them included a GRI content index, sometimes separate from the report and online, usually identifying pages of the report on which information pertaining to each G3 performance indicator could be found, but sometimes referring or linked to report sections or other online material, and occasionally containing the entirety of the response to the topic. Many of the GRI content indices also included some indication of the degree to which each performance indicator had been addressed, usually at one of the three levels: no compliance, partial compliance, or full compliance. Generally in these indices, no compliance meant that the topic was not included in the report in any fashion, and partial compliance meant that the topic was addressed somehow, but not necessarily in a way that met the letter of the G3 guidelines. An indication of full compliance meant, in some reports, that the G3 performance indicator was addressed exactly as apparently intended by GRI, but in others meant only that the topic was discussed. Thus, reference solely to the GRI content indices does not provide any certainty of the degree to which specific performance indicators are addressed.
Enel (Enel 2008) and Fiat (Fiat Group 2008) do a particularly nice job with their GRI indices, arranging all of their discussions specifically by GRI G3 guidelines. Figure 1 is a reproduction of a small part of the Enel report, representative of the way each of the GRI G3 guidelines is addressed. The entire report is made up of these indicator-byindicator responses, preceded by a general statement at the beginning of each section. Johnson Controls (Johnson Controls 2008) goes even farther, producing an austere report (no color, no pictures, no diagrams) entirely composed of material speaking to the G3 guidelines. This report is an excellent example of how simple full compliance with GRI guidelines can be, at least from a reporting standpoint. In fact, it appears to be automatically generated from a database, an approach which makes continuous updating feasible and relatively simple and which can directly drive corporate sustainability websites (Gómez 2004 , Morhardt 2008 leading to the possibility of automated tagging of the data with G3 XBRL codes using GRI's G3 XBRL taxonomy (GRI 2008c) which would make it possible to automate analyses of the type on which this paper is based (Morhardt 2008) .
The distribution of adequate responses to each of the HR Performance Indicators by each industrial sector is shown in Table 3 . From the sums of topics at the bottom of Table 3 , it can be seen that the Motor Vehicles and Parts sector is by far the most diligent in reporting, addressing collectively 90 topics. The Communications and Mail sector is by far the least diligent, addressing only 18 topics. The remaining sectors all address at least 54 topics. The Communications and Mail sector also has the fewest (9) self-declared G3 reporters, but only two fewer than the Motor Vehicles and Parts sector, demonstrating that adoption of the G3 guidelines is not necessarily indicative of compliance with them. The percentage of significant investment agreements that include human rights clauses or have undergone human rights screening (HR1A), and the total number of such agreements (HR1B), each received only five responses. Banco Santander is quantitative in this regard, and therefore meets the requirements HR1A and 1B with the simple statement, 'There was no significant investment agreement which involved clauses regarding human rights' (Grupo Santander 2007). Allianz (Allianz SE 2008) simply states, 'No quantifiable influence' as it also does on HR2, 3, 6, 8, and 9, technically meeting all of the G3 reporting criteria with three words, but not providing illumination of any processes that might be in place to identify or prevent such influences. Johnson Control's report (Johnson Controls 2008) provides adequate information for every single G3 HR topic with the exception of the total number of investment agreements it has (HR1B) because. 'Total number of contracts in place at any year is considered company sensitive information' even though all of them were subjected to human rights screening. The ING Group report ( ING Group 2008) states that its specialized team submitted '... a number...' of financial agreements to social screening and that '... 9 of these received negative advice,' a decline from the 25 of previous years. This disclosure does not meet the criteria of HR1A or 1B because it doesn't identify the percentage or number of the agreements that have undergone or met the requirements, but rather the number that have not. Still, this is more information than most other reporters produce. Daimler declines to respond to HR1 in its 2008 Sustainability Report Online GRI Index (Daimler 2008) with the statement, 'For a globally operating company like Daimler, the registration of such an index would only be possible with unreasonable effort. Generally we consider human rights issues in all our business engagements and relations. The percentage of significant suppliers and contractors that have undergone screening on human rights (HR2A) was addressed in 10 reports, but as in responses to HR1, most of the answers consisted of the equivalent of 'none' or 'not relevant'. In 2006 Volkswagen went much further stating that '… in the future, every supplier throughout the world must proffer a declaration that he operates environmentally, complies with health and safety regulations and seeks to establish social fairness in his facilities' (Volkswagen 2006 Judging what actions taken to screen suppliers and contractors (HR2B) might meet the letter of the G3 guidelines is more problematic. More than half of the reports reviewed in this study indicated that the companies had formally adopted social policies, often from third parties, that meet HR2B as well as HR4B, 5B, 6B, and 7B. I accepted such formal adoption as meeting the requirements of an action toward screening suppliers. Most reports say little more than that the policies have been adopted but some indicate the corporate processes involved. Volkswagen (Volkswagen 2006) , for example, says it has adopted the International Metalworkers Federation Declaration on Social Rights and Industrial Relations (International Metalworkers Federation 2003) and goes on to say, 'The act of inscribing these rights alone would make such a declaration meaningless. VW has taken the step of publicizing its charter at all of its locations. VW has taken the step of publicizing its charter at all of its locations ensuring that the workforce knows its rights, with the global group works council monitoring compliance (Volkswagen. 2006) . All and any indications that this behaviour code is violated anywhere are taken seriously and followed up. Only five companies report the total hours of employee training on procedures concerning aspects of human rights that are relevant to operations (HR3A) and 12 companies report the percentage of employees so trained (HR3B) mostly with answers such as 'No quantifiable influence' (e.g., Allianz SE 2008) , or the equivalent of 'none', or 'all'. Daimler (Daimler 2008) , perhaps speaking for the majority of reporters, says, 'Quantifiable data is [sic] not available here, as the expense and effort required to collect it cannot be justified'.
Seven companies report the total numbers of incidents of discrimination (HR4A) but, as shown in Table 3 , 57 have policies in place to prevent discrimination (HR4B). Considering that this topic includes all forms of discrimination including two that seem possible in any business-discrimination based on gender or race-it seems surprising that only a few over half of the companies describe a formal policy against it. It is less surprising that incidents of discrimination go unreported; there seems little to be gained by the reporting company by publicizing policy failures of this nature.
HR5A, dealing with the right to exercise freedom of association and collective bargaining might well have been written in parallel with HR1A and 2A requiring identification of percentage of employees covered by collective bargaining agreements and addressed fairly widely in the reports reviewed here. This statistic, however, is called for in the G3 Labor Practices and Decent work performance indicator LA4, and the HR5A standard expects identification of the operations in which such rights may be at significant risk. Only four reports responded to this topic, all indicating that none of their operations were at risk. More than half of the companies have policies in place or have taken other actions to support these rights (HR5B).
With respect to child labour or of forced or compulsory labour, HR6A and 7A follow HR5A in calling for listing operations identified as having significant risk of such incidents. Six companies report the former and seven the latter, all by simply responding with 'No operations identified' (e.g., Allianz SE 2008) or its equivalent, or with a somewhat longer statement containing the same information, like,'... no events were identified involving exploitation of children or work under coercion ' (Grupo Santander 2007) . If there are any operations at such risk, none of the reports here identified them. The closest any report came to discussing process was Shell's indication (Shell 2008b ) that 99 per cent of its own operations, 98 per cent of its contractors, and 96 per cent of its suppliers had procedures in place to prevent child labour.
The percent security personnel with HR training (HR8) and number of incidents of violation of indigenous rights (HR9A) were each addressed by only four companies, and in all cases the response was 'none'. Finally, 14 companies addressed actions taken to prevent violation of indigenous rights, and although in most instances these were simply in the form of policy, some were more explicit. Lukoil (Lukoil 2007 HR9A expects the total number of incidents of violation involving rights of indigenous people to be disclosed, but corporations are much more likely to emphasize the positive, as in this example. Actions taken to reduce numbers of incidents of violations involving rights of indigenous people (HR9B) was addressed in policy much less than the other actions or measures topics, probably because few of the companies represented in this sample have dealings with indigenous people and reject the topic on the grounds of materiality, either explicitly or implicitly. Table 4 shows the percentages of companies within each sector meeting the requirements of the individual G3 performance indicators both for all 100 companies, and for the 71 G3 reporters. The percentage of companies responding to individual performance indicators as well as the average values for all indicators is better for the G3 reporters across the board. Still, with the exception of the action items that were considered to meet G3 guidelines in this analysis solely by adoption of policy (HR2B, 4B, 5B, 6B, 7B, and 9B), the percentages of companies complying with the G3 HR guidelines are relatively low, in most cases below 20 per cent and in some sectors, even below than that. In another study examining the per cent of large capital firms by industry having supplier labour policies (RiskMetrics Group 2008), overall only 20 per cent had a supplier labour code and only 15 per cent had codes dealing with child labour and forced labour. This was much higher in sectors they describe as being high risk (none of which are included in this study), but even in medium risk sectors which include the motor vehicles and parts, and other manufacturing sectors in this study, 27-45 per cent had such policies. In the low risk sectors which include the remaining sectors treated in this paper, telecommunications had 23 per cent involvement, banks had 10-13 per cent, and energy had 4-5 per cent. Here we find that the adoption of such policies by the parent company is much higher, in the motor vehicles and parts sector, 80-100 percent depending on whether all companies or just G3 companies are considered. In the low risk sector of banks it is 35-50 per cent, and even lower for telecommunications; 11-22 per cent.
Conclusions
That so many of the largest companies have formally adopted various social and labour standards and almost all are now producing standalone corporate social responsibility reports indicates widespread adoption of the concept of formal social reporting. That threequarters of them have formally adopted the GRI G3 reporting guidelines indicates a willingness to subscribe to standardized reporting, even though, as this study shows, that subscription does not necessarily translate into full compliance. The lack of compliance is striking in the human rights reporting reviewed here and it is worth asking why. One reason, so eloquently pointed out by Daimler (Daimler 2008 ) is cost. Much of the data requested by G3 HR performance indicators is difficult to collect and not seen to be of value by the companies asked to collect it. Another is uncertainty; a company may not know which, if any, of its operations are at risk of child labour, forced labour, or lack of freedom of association, and may not want to publicize something that may be inherently uncertain and is, in any case, unpleasant. Finally, the self-damning nature of some of the data, if in fact any were collected, is surely off-putting; it is understandable that reporting the number of incidents of discrimination and violation of the rights of indigenous people is unpalatable. It would seem to me that investors and other stakeholders might be equally well served by assurance that these problems are unlikely to occur, and that assurance could take the form of descriptions of the formal policies and procedures in place to prevent them from occurring. If the performance indicators were rephrased to ask for this information it might push companies to adopt policies and procedures where none previously existed, and once adopted, there should be little reason not to report them. Considering how little some of the guidelines are followed, it might make sense for GRI to recast them in a form that companies are willing to follow. 
